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Nationalism lacks any coherent normative justication. While this argument gains
some plausibility from the general normative weakness of political claims based
solely on nationalist ideology, a balanced treatment of the conict would surely
have to examine the normative basis of Unionist counterclaims, since as Archard
recognizes it is these that render Nationalist claims problematic in the rst place.
But he simply excludes this question from his purview: ‘The relevant point here
is less how Unionism denies what Nationalism asserts but that this denial helps
to constitute the problem of Northern Ireland’ (p. 146). It is difcult to avoid the
impression that the unstated assumption of Archard’s approach is that the source
of the Northern Ireland problem is the unreasonable claims of Nationalists.
The principal weakness of his argument, however, stems from its counter-
factual character. I do not doubt that the ultimate solution to the conict lies in
a scheme of consociational democracy which would secure the legitimate social,
political, economic and cultural claims of both communities; and this is indeed
what all parties to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement have accepted in principle.
The question, though, is whether this can be achieved without some change in the
constitutional status of the province. Under social goods, for example, Archard
classies ‘such general, valued attributes as esteem, status and respect’, ‘associ-
ated with a variety of practices, activities and associations which are located within
civil society, such as employment, education and, perhaps centrally, religion’ (pp.
152–3). But Nationalists have claimed, with considerable justice, that they were
effectively denied a fair share of precisely such goods by a constitutional arrange-
ment that guaranteed Unionists a permanent position of political dominance in
the province. Thus Archard’s rejection of any alteration in the constitutional status
of Northern Ireland, such as some form of joint British and Irish authority over
the province, ab initio as ‘concessive to the Nationalist position in ways which
Unionists dispute’ (p. 151), is questionable, since any viable solution will have to
make some concessions to Nationalist demands. Moreover, it seems to overlook
the fact that the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, if implemented (nego-
tiations between the parties to the Agreement were still in progress at the time
of writing), would arguably amount to a change in the constitutional status quo
by, among other things, setting up cross-border governmental bodies.
However, this is something that readers of this volume will be able to judge for
themselves, since the editors have helpfully included the text of the Agreement
as an appendix, and it proves to be an important document in its own right which
is surely destined to inuence the resolution of inter-communal conicts beyond
the island of Ireland. And it must be conceded that Archard’s essay, notwith-
standing its restricted purview, does present an interesting normative perspective
on the conict, and the other essays in the volume can be recommended to students
and scholars of nationalism alike.
University of Illinois at Chicago Ciaran Cronin
Trois femmes dans des sombres temps: Edith Stein, Hannah Arendt, Simone
Weil ou Amor fati, amor mundi
By Sylvie Courtine-Denamy
Albin Michel, 1997. Pp. 307. ISBN 2–226–08878–4.
This book is an intelligent reading of the Second World War through the eyes 
of three Jewish women philosophers. It provides an insight into the women’s 
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understanding of and reaction to the Nazi regime, and this in turn brings the
period back to life. By providing not one but three different accounts of the events,
it introduces perspective into the chronological investigation, showing, for example,
that it was only six months after Edith Stein had died in Auschwitz, in August
1942, that the existence of such death camps was brought to the attention of an
incredulous Hannah Arendt. The book is a study in comparative philosophical
biography, with sections devoted to comparative philosophy. Its strength is to bring
out what is basic in each of the philosophers’ work, and to relate it both to their
invididual lives and to their shared experience of the war.
It is the person of Hannah Arendt who is at the centre. Her post-war writings
are read against the background of the silence of her two colleagues, who did not
survive the war. As the survivor, she speaks for the three, who, despite differ-
ences in philosophical outlook, were comparable, even similar, in relation to the
war: they were all Jewish women who had chosen philosophy as their study and
career; they were all silenced and destined for death by the administrators of the
‘nal solution’.
It is not Arendt’s knowledge of the other two which justies the comparison, even
if she is acquainted with them. She refers to Weil in the Human Condition (1958, p.
131) in order to endorse her criticism of Marx. She seems to have known the polit-
ical philosophy of Weil quite well, and to have drawn inspiration from it. Like Weil,
Arendt denounces the fundamental contradiction involved in regarding labour as
being on the one hand the essence of man, and on the other an obstacle to be over-
come. She also, like Weil, regards labour as being indispensable even to the most
mechanized society, in which conspicuous consumption and leisure would not dis-
pense with the necessity of participating in the metabolism of nature (pp. 84–96).
Arendt refers to Stein only in 1963, when, encouraged by Jaspers, she devotes
an article to Rolf Hochhuth’s Der Stellvertreter. In it, Stein gures as the German
Jewish nun who before the war requested the Pope to devote an Encyclical to the
Jewish question, but received only a blessing in return (pp. 206–7). Arendt does
not show signs of familiarity with Stein’s philosophy, which is surprising consid-
ering their common phenomenological ancestry.
The three philosophers’ different ways of relating to what they have in common
remain the focus of the book. They are the subject of a specic analysis in the
rst part, ‘Les années de formation’ (‘The years of formation’), which treats of
their childhood, their choice and critique of their masters, and their understanding
of being women and of being Jewish.
All three manifested intellectual gifts already as children. This later meant that
they learned to have a critical appreciation of those whom they chose as their
masters. Stein departed from Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology because
she thought it unfaithful to its own programme of ‘turning towards the things
themselves’. On her own account she complemented this programme with scholas-
ticism, which she found in some ways went further. Arendt, happy with Husserl’s
world-view, but also wanting to concretize it existentially and politically, rejected
the neo-Thomism of Pieper, Maritain and Gilson, and praised what she regarded
as its opposite: the existentialism of Sartre, Camus and Merleau-Ponty (pp. 39–40).
However, both Heidegger and Jaspers (with both of whom she studied), despite
their association with existentialism, were also criticized by her: Heidegger for not
regarding Da-sein as sufciently at home in the world, and Jaspers for thinking
that reason arises out of the private sphere of the I and the Thou, and not, as
Arendt thought, out of the public sphere of political plurality. Weil alone endorsed
the basic tenets of her master Alain’s thought, his pacicism and Christianity, even
if she died prepared for battle and without receiving baptism.
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Weil is also portrayed as the one who denied her femininity and despised her
Jewishness to the point of self-destruction. Stein, on the contrary, is seen as the fem-
inist nun who was denied a career because she was a woman, and was killed because
she was a Jew. Arendt, steering a middle course between self-denial and martyr-
dom, is seen to be puzzled by femininity and Jewishness alike, but to regard both
as inescapable facts of the world, to be reckoned with but not to be trapped by.
The next two parts of the book, ‘Quels engagements dans le monde?’ (‘What
commitments within the world?’), covering the period between 1933 and 1939,
and ‘L’exil’ (‘Exile’), covering the period between 1940 and 1943, are strictly
chronological, even as they reach out into the philosophical works of each of the
authors to anchor them in the events they lived through. The titles capture yet
something more that all three had in common: they were politically committed,
and they were forced into exile.
Their political engagements were diverse: Simone Weil was a heterodox
Communist or anarchist, and always seemed to travel to the centre of human
experience. She actually went to Berlin in 1933 in order to study Nazism, just as
she got herself employment at the Renault factory in order to experience for
herself the impact of the workers’ conditions. Hannah Arendt laboured herself
out of the war as an agnostic Zionist transporting Jewish children to Palestine,
and politics remained the focus of her life. Edith Stein, choosing another course
of action, became a Carmelite; a commitment she herself likened to the public
role of Queen Esther interceding for the Israelites while in exile.
Their exiles also were signicantly different. Stein chose it already when she
entered the cloister in Cologne in 1933; it was with regret that she ed to another
Carmelite convent in the then unoccupied Holland. She would have ed later to
Switzerland if time had permitted, but events caught up with her: eeing was no
longer her rst priority when she was summoned by the Gestapo in 1942. Arendt
was to make exile the permanent condition of her life: she sought and obtained
American citizenship in 1951, unwilling to return to a Germany she had so loathed.
Weil found it painful to abandon France in May 1942 for New York, and she soon
returned to London in the hope of making connections with the French resistance.
Formation, commitment, exile and death. The book abruptly – or aptly – ends
with 1943, true to the shape of the lives of the three Jewesses portrayed. Their
involvement with the Nazi regime had ended by then – ironically, it did so at the
height of Hitler’s power. Arendt, together with her second husband, Heinrich
Blücher, had ed France for America in May 1941. Arendt immediately set about
writing; she would not stop until her death in December 1975. Her writings all carry
the stamp of the war. Edith Stein had been gassed, probably on 9 August 1942, in
Auschwitz together with her sister. She never lived to imagine the end of the war,
or even the survival of the Jewish race. Simone Weil had died of tuberculosis and
self-inicted starvation in a London sanatorium on 24 August 1943. She – in her
equal hatred of Nazism and Jewry – did not quite want to survive either, and she
found it unbearable to be away from the France she so loved.
The lives and deaths of these three women both reveal and conceal their deepest
philosophical commitments. The subtitle of the book, Amor fati, amor mundi,
muses on this: perhaps Arendt did win over fate for love of the world, as she
escaped the near fatal ‘nal solution’ and survived. Even so, she remained super-
stitious all her life. And perhaps Weil was stoical enough to love fate more than
the world as she pushed towards her death from illness and solidarity. Yet she
remained a revolutionary. Stein, however, loved neither fate nor the world, but
she could be said to have embraced both in the title of nobility she chose for the
order of Carmel: Teresia-Benedicta of the Cross. Her love was of another world.
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The book is an absorbing and hugely documented read. Its real loyalty is to
Arendt, and the contrast with the other two thinkers somehow serves this purpose.
It situates her as the survivor, who is left to recall and commemorate the all-
important event which alone accounts for the silence of the other two: The War.
The careers of Weil and Stein were prematurely cut off at this point, but for
Arendt it was the kick-start of a vocation as a professional political thinker,
somehow devoted to commemorate all those who did not survive. This is what
makes the book the perfect historical introduction to the work of Hannah Arendt.
May it be well read.
National University of Ireland, Maynooth Mette Lebech
The Kantian Subject: Sensus Communis, Mimesis, Work of Mourning
By Tamar Japaridze
SUNY Press, 2000. Pp. 168. ISBN 0–791–44374–4.
The central claim of this work is that Kant’s Critique of Judgment advances an
account of the formation of the subject through a process of affective identica-
tion. The signicance of this claim, as set out by Japaridze in her introduction, is
that it locates a distance within the critical corpus from the ‘autonomous subject’
that otherwise joins Kant to the Enlightenment tradition of philosophy. From this
dislocation of Kant from the Enlightenment conception of autonomy follows a
further dislocation effected by Japaridze within the order of the three Kantian
Critiques. For Japaridze the stage of the subject’s constitution is logically prior to
the process of its division in the rst and second Critiques (as respectively a cogni-
tive and a moral subject). Thus she reorders the critical philosophy to place the
work which advances an account of the formation of the subject before those
which theorize its division. Her argument regarding the signicance of the Critique
of Judgment within the critical system does not refer to the contents of the other
Critiques in any substantial way and draws its detail only from the rst part of
this work: the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.
Her attention to the aesthetics of the third Critique is timely given recent interest
in its place within the Kantian system. Japaridze’s view that this Critique explains
the genesis of the subject’s capacity for practical reason is supported by a frame-
work in which she connects Kant to currents in twentieth-century continental
philosophy concerning subjectivity and ethics. Hence this book lters many of
Kant’s ideas through concepts with either a Freudian or a poststructuralist lineage.
‘Mourning’ and ‘sublimation’ are the key terms in Japaridze’s rephrasing of the
Kantian aesthetic attitude, and ‘alterity’ is the value which she ascribes to the
‘ethics’ of the aesthetic subject.
The project of a conjunction between Kant and recent continental philosophy
is an interesting one that is pursued by Japaridze in three compact chapters: the
rst dealing with the place of beauty in the system of Kantian philosophy, the
second with the sensus communis and the third with Kant’s appendix on the
sublime. Throughout the author’s concern is with the theme of ethics, and in the
conclusion she attempts to bring this theme into correspondence with its twen-
tieth-century inection through the problem of language. Her rather lengthy
introduction (by far the longest section of the book) offers a schematic survey of
the historical reception of the Critique of Judgment as well as an introduction to
some of the Freudian terminology relied on in her own analysis of Kant. However,
BOOK RE VIEWS
411
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
 ]
 a
t 0
4:
30
 0
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
2 
